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Abstract 
The product market competition is one of the factors contributing to earnings management. It forces managers to manipulate the 
firm’s earning for opportunistic reasons. Intense competition in product market forces manages to manipulate corporate earnings 
so that by reduction of financial pressures via acquisition of low-cost external financial resources and reduction of capital costs, 
the product prices are lowered; this in turn gives the firm a competitive advantage by which it acquires a greater share of the market 
and raises above other competitors. On this basis, the present paper studies the relationship between intense competition in the 
product market and earnings management. As far as the dimensions of competition are concerned, market size, entry costs, and 
centralization are the three factors used to measure the competition in product market. In order to examine the hypotheses, the 
financial statements of 77 companies listed in Tehran stock exchange in 5 industry levels over the time period 2002-2011 are 
analyzed using regression analysis. The results reveal that factors of entry cost and industry concentration have a significant 
relationship with earnings management. However, in contrast with existing research literature, the relationship between market size 
and earnings management is not confirmed. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of SCIJOUR-Scientific Journals Publisher. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the modern literature of economic development, there are numerous instances of discussions about the structure 
of the market in which the producers are active. One of the most important subjects in such discussions is providing 
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an appropriate medium for competition between economic actors. In this sense, introduction of competition into 
markets and business activities is known as a cure for inefficiency and under-development (Mehrabani, 2012). 
The emphasis on competition is of course an age-old idea. Ever since Adam Smith’s (1776) quote “monopoly is a 
great enemy of good management” until Caves (1980), who states that economists have a “vague suspicion that 
competition is the enemy of sloth” this idea that competition is an important crucial factor of economic growth has 
been preserved and advertised (Karuna et al., 2012). 
Nowadays, competitiveness is considered to be a main global issue. It is known as a means to achieve desirable 
economic growth and sustainable development. Competitiveness is the ability to attain a stable and appropriate 
position in international markets. In an age when globalization is increasingly on the rise, competitiveness is an 
important subject among policy-makers, industries, and firms all over the world (Shur Chuluu, 2000). 
However, despite great benefits of competitive market for nations’ economy, recent studies suggest that intense 
product market competition increases the likelihood of risk taking and fraudulent behaviors by firm managers. Shleifer 
(2004) explains that if a firm manages to reduce its tax payments and other costs through corruption and bribe, its 
competitors are forced either to do so or exit the market. Therefore, the impact of intense competition on unethical 
behavior can extend to earnings manipulation in firms. It seems that earnings management is one of the ways through 
which company executives can confront pressures and threats of intense competition. On this basis, in order to help 
stakeholders and those who benefit from accounting information and to expand the existing literature on the subject, 
the following question is explored in this study: 
What is the nature of relationship between intense competition in product market and earnings management? 
2. Theoretical basis and research hypotheses 
2.1. Product market competition and earnings management 
Although the idea that as a crucial part of a business environment earnings management can be beneficial to 
shareholders, evidence points out to the fact that firms’ earnings are intentionally manipulated in order to manage 
shareholders’ opinions. This behavior is exacerbated when competition is greater in the industry, thus leading to firms 
in the industry managing earnings on average (Bagnoli & Watts, 2010). Shleifer (2004) argues that when the product 
market competition is intense, in order to increase the firm’s stock value, managers are forced to manipulate the 
earnings in order to keep the actual investors and motivate potential investors to invest in the company. Further, if 
managers’ freedom in decision-making and authority in choosing accounting methods are accompanied by great 
competition, it gives them greater latitude to engage in such opportunistic attempts (earnings management) especially 
concerning actions that are less observable or understandable due to their complex nature (Christie, Joye, & Watts, 
2003; Kole & Lehn, 1997). 
Linck, Netter, and Shu (2010) suggest that using earnings management firm managers can alleviate financial 
pressures and acquire financial resources with lower costs. Therefore a firm with lower costs of capital can better price 
products and acquire a larger share of the market (Karuna et al., quoted from Linck, Netter, and Shu, 2010). 
Based on these discussions, the main hypothesis of this study is presented as follows: 
The main hypothesis: intense competition in product market increase earnings management in the firms. 
Product market competition and earnings management can be assessed and measured in various ways. In this study, 
the three factors of size of the industry, entry costs, and industry concentration are used to measure product market 
competition. Also in order to measure earnings management, the modified Jones model has been employed. In this 
model, the extent of using discretionary accruals is the criterion for measurement of earnings management. 
2.2. Industry size and earnings management 
The industry size reflects the market demand and the density of consumers in the industry. When the demands for 
a product with a certain price increase then the sales of that product naturally rise. Then due to likelihood of its 
profitability more firms inter the industry and the industry size becomes bigger. This in turn intensifies the competition 
in that industry (Karuna et al. 2012; quoted from Sutton, 1991). 
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For that reason, it is expected that along with increase in industry size and the subsequent increase in the 
competition, the attempts on earnings management by the firms also increase in number and consistency. On that 
basis, the first sub-hypothesis of the present study is explained as follows: 
The first sub-hypothesis: there is a positive and significant relationship between industry size and discretionary 
accruals. 
2.3. Entry costs 
Entry costs refer to the barriers to entry in an industry. The higher these barriers, the lower will be the intensity of 
price competition. In other words, the more capital, technology, and other factors required for entering an industry, 
the competition in that industry would be less intense. On the other hand, the lower these barriers to entry in an 
industry, the higher will be the intensity of price competition (Karuna et al. 2012). 
For that reason, it is expected that along with decrease of entry cost and subsequent increase of product market 
competition, the attempts on earnings management by the firms increase in number and consistency. On that basis, 
the second sub-hypothesis of the present study is explained as follows: 
The second sub-hypothesis: there is a negative and significant relationship between entry cost and discretionary 
accruals. 
2.4. Industry concentration and earnings management 
Industry concentration reflects the major volume of production and sales controlled by on or more active firms of 
an industry. When one or a few firms possess a major share of production and sales in an industry, other firms’ ability 
to work in that industry is reduced and monopoly takes hold. On the other hand, as the industry concentration is 
reduced, more companies enter the industry and hence the competition intensifies (Karuna et al. 2012). 
Therefor it is expected that along with decreased concentration, the competition intensifies and earnings 
management in the firms of that industry increases. On that basis, the third sub-hypothesis of the present study is 
explained as follows: 
The third sub-hypothesis: there is a positive and significant relationship between industry concentration and 
discretionary accruals. 
3. Methodology 
By nature, the present research is a correlational study, and by purpose it is an applied research. The required 
statistical analyses have been carried out using Eviews software program. In order to analyze the data and examine 
the hypotheses the multivariate linear regression with the ordinary least squares method has been employed. The data 
used to test the hypothesis is compositional data which has been determined via appropriate estimation using Limmer 
F-test and Hausman test. The statistical population is consisted of companies listed in Tehran stock exchange. The 
study’s time period is from 2002 to 2011. The sample members are determined after elimination procedure, in the 
sense that the sample firms have the following features and characteristics: 
x Their fiscal year ends in March 20th. 
x The period of their fiscal year has not been changed during the studied time period. 
x The book value of the shareholders’ payment in the studied time period is not negative. 
x Are not among the bankrupt firms mentioned in article 141 of trade law. 
x Their information is accessible. 
x They are production companies, and are not one of holding, leasing, financial intermediate, or investment firms. 
x For the purpose of measuring intense production competition, at least six firms should be active in their same 
area of industry; also their average indicators of industry size, entry cost, and industry concentration (which are 
the criteria of measuring intense competition) must be high, low, and low respectively. 
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Based on the above observations, the firms which have not met these criteria have been eliminated from the sample. 
In the end, 77 firms in 5 industries have been selected; and 770 firm-years in the form of 50 industry-years have been 
studied. 
4. Research model 
In order to examine the hypotheses, model (1) has been used: 
 
ti
titi
titi
tititi
VOLATILITYAVGREVENUE
ONCYCLEAVGOPERATIMBAVGLN
SALEAVGLNAVGHINDEX
AVGENTCOSTAVGMKTSIZEDA
,7
,6,5
,4,3
,2,10,
)(
)(
E
EE
EE
EEE


 
                                (1) 
4.1. Dependent variable 
DAi,t= discretionary accruals which are indicators of earnings management. In order to determine discretionary 
accruals in this research, the modified Jones model 2 has been used: 
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Wherein: 
tiTACC , = firm i’s total accruals in year t;                                                                                                                 
1, tiASSET = firm i’s total assets in year t-1;  
tiSALE ,' = change in firm i’s sales from year t-1 to year t;              
tiAR ,' = change in firm i’s accounts receivable from operating activities from year t-1 to year t;  
tiPPE , = firm i’s gross property, plant, and equipment in year t.  
tiV , = models residual which is used to determine discretionary accruals, and their mean absolute value in industry-
year level is used as dependent variable of model (1).  
4.2. Explanatory variables 
Among the explanatory variable in model (1), the first three are the main variables which are indicators of product 
market competition; and the other explanatory variables are control variables which based on the literature have a part 
in earnings management. 
tiAVGMKTSIZE ,  = the natural logarithm of industry sales in each industry-year. It denotes the industry size and its 
larger values denote greater market size and hence greater competition. 
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tiAVGENTCOST , = the natural logarithm of the weighted average gross value of the cost of property, plant, and 
equipment for firms weighted by each firm’s market share in the industry. This factor indicates the barriers of industry 
entry and its smaller values reflect less intense competition. 
tiAVGHINDEX , = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which determines industry concentration.  It is the sum of the squared 
market shares of the firms in the industry in each industry-year. The smaller values of this index denote more intense 
competition in product market. 
tiSALEAVGLN ,)( =Firm size which is equal to the natural log of firm sales over each industry-year. 
tiMBAVGLN ,)( = Market-to-book ratio which is equal to the natural log of market value/book value of shareholder 
equity in each industry-year. 
tiONCYCLEAVGOPERATI , = natural log of average firm operating cycle in each industry-year calculated using the 
formula below. 
 
 
 
tiVOLATILITYAVGREVENUE , =Sales volatility which is the standard deviation of sales scaled by beginning assets 
during each industry-year. 
The AVG sign indicates the fact the in order to develop the data matrix for examination of the hypotheses, the 
mean for firm-year variables should be calculated in industry-year level. 
5. Research findings 
In the present paper, before hypothesis examination the descriptive statistics of the research variables are explored 
and then the Limmer F-test has been employed in order to determine the most appropriate regression model; in the 
end the hypotheses are examined. 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics regarding the research variables are presented in table 1. 
 
Average accounts 
receivable 
Average inventory 
Average accounts 
payable 
Sales Cost of goods sold Purchase 
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                       Table 1. descriptive statistics of the research variables 
variables Number of 
observations 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. deviation 
Discretionary 
accruals 
50 103.0 197.0 046.0 032.0 
Industry size 50 20.16 08.19 35.14 272.1 
Entry costs 50 732.8 20.10 849.6 795.0 
Concentration 50 183.0 404.0 070.0 095.0 
Firm size 50 70.12 73.13 78.11 489.0 
Market-to-
book value 
50 831.0 614.2 181.0- 653.0 
Operating 
cycle 
50 460.5 743.5 945.4 191.0 
As demonstrated, the number of observations equal 50 industry-years. The mean for discretionary accruals in 
industry level is 0.103.  Its minimum, maximum, and standard deviation are 0.046, 0.197, and 0.032 respectively, 
which indicate the normality of distribution for dependent variable and normality of regression model’s residual. For 
industry size, mean, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum are 16.20, 1.272, 19.08, and 14.3 respectively. This 
indicates normality of the data. Also the large mean value of industry size points out to the intensity of competition 
between firms in the industries. As for entry cost, the mean value is 8.732, standard deviation, maximum, and 
minimum are 0.795, 10.20, and 6.849 respectively. This indicates that entry costs are low and the competition among 
firms is intense. Also the mean value of concentration index equals 0.183, and the minimum and maximum are 0.070 
and 0.404 respectively. This also points out to low industry concentration and high competition. 
5.2. Test of model determination 
In order to test the H0 hypothesis (using pooled model) as opposed to H1 hypothesis (using panel model), the 
Limmer F-test has been employed. The hypotheses for this test are defined as below: 
H0: pooled model 
H1: panel model 
Table 2 represents pooled data vs. panel data. 
      Table 2. pooled data vs. panel data 
Test                                   Statistic 
value 
Sig. Result 
Limmer F-test                            454.0 893.0   H0 is confirmed 
 
Considering the test results, the use of pooled data is confirmed. Therefore there is no need to carry out Hausman 
test to determine fixed effects vs. random effects in panel data model, and the regression model is assessed using least 
ordinary squares method. The results of model 1 estimation are presented in table 3. Based on the obtained results, F-
statistic equals 7.591 and confirms the regression model at the 0.000 significance level. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of determination indicates that 0.56 percent of change in dependent variable can be explained by 
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independent variables. Also the value of Durbin-Watson statistic equals 1.92 which indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation between independent variables. In the test of the relationship between product market competition and 
earnings management, the coefficient of industry size variable which is considered to be an indicator of competition 
equals -0.025, and its t-statistic is -3.92 which is significant at the 0.000 level and indicates that this factor has a 
negative and significant relationship with discretionary accruals. Yet, regarding the existing research literature it was 
expected that there is a positive relationship between industry size and discretionary accruals. However the hereby 
obtained results confirm a negative relation between industry size and product market competition. On this basis, the 
first sub-hypothesis is rejected. 
Moreover, the coefficient of entry costs variable as the second indicator of competition equals -0.021, and its t-
statistic is -2.90 which is significant at the 0.005 level and confirms the relationship between entry costs and 
discretionary accruals. On this basis, there is a negative and statistically significant between this indicator of 
competition and discretionary accruals, and therefore the second sub-hypothesis is confirmed. 
Table 3. the impact of competition on discretionary accruals 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-statistic Sig. 
Constant 736.0- 220.0 39.3- 001.0 
Industry size 025.0- 06.00 92.3- 0.000 
Entry costs 021.0- 0.007 90.2- 0.005 
Concentration 25.0 07.0 51.3 001.0 
Firm size 078.0 0.013 82.5 000.0 
Market-to-book value 0.010 0.008 24.1 218.0 
Operating cycle 065.0 031.0 08.2 043.0 
Sales volatility 0.245 098.0 485.2 0.017 
Coefficient of determination    
56.0 
Adjusted coefficient of 
determination 
F-statistic 
48.0 
591.7  
P-value 0.000 
The test of the relationship between concentration as the third indicator for measurement of product market 
competition and discretionary accruals indicates that the coefficient of industry concentration variable equals 0.25, 
and its t-statistic is 3.51, which is significant at the 0.001 level. This indicates that this factor has a positive and 
significant relationship with discretionary accruals; hence the third sub-hypothesis is confirmed. Among the control 
variable of model (1), only the relationship between market-to-book value of shareholders’ equity and discretionary 
accruals can not be confirmed; however the relationship of other variables are statistically significant. 
 
6. Conclusion and suggestions 
The present study has been an effort to identify the impact of intense competition in product market on earnings 
management. It seeks to confirm the relationship between dimensions and indicators of competition and earnings 
management so that the body of literature on earnings management could be expanded. The results obtained in the 
present research reveal that: 
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x There is a negative relationship between industry size as the first indicator of product market competition and 
discretionary accruals. As opposed to what was expected, this relationship is not positive and therefore the first 
sub-hypothesis is rejected. 
x The relationship between entry costs and discretionary accruals indicated a significant and negative nature. This 
reveals that by decrease of entry costs and intensification of competition, the use of discretionary accruals for 
earnings management will increase. On this basis, the second sub-hypothesis is confirmed. 
x Examination of the relationship between concentration and discretionary accruals reveals that there is a positive 
and significant relationship between these two variables. This means that that by reduction of concentration and 
intensification of competition, the use of discretionary accruals for earnings management will increase. Therefore 
the third sub-hypothesis is confirmed. 
x Concerning the results of the sub-hypotheses examination, it can be concluded that there is a significant 
relationship between intense competition in product market and discretionary accrual-based earnings 
management. Hence the research main hypothesis is confirmed. 
In the end, in order to follow up this research and carry out similar studies regarding the relationship between 
product market competition and earnings management, it is suggested that the following issues are taken into 
consideration: 
x Considering the dimensions of product market competition and different methods of measuring competition and 
earnings management, it is suggested that the relationship between competition and earnings management is 
examined with regard to those dimensions and using different methods. 
x It is suggested that for future studies, researchers categorize markets in terms of structure (i.e. monopolistic, 
perfect, or imperfect competition) and compare them in terms of earnings management.  
x Finally, it should be noted that a similar study can be carried out on insurance or banking industry, or any other 
industry which has not been included in the present research due to sampling limitations.  
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